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Abstract
This paper extends the notion of the rational agent in economics by
acknowledging the role of the unconscious in the agents decision-making
process. It argues that the unconscious can be modelled by a rational
agent with his own objective function and set of information. The com-
bination of both the conscious and unconscious agents is called the "dual
agent".
This dual agent presents rationally biased behaviors that may not
disappear through aggregation, and could be potentially measured.
It also provides a theoretical approach to the emotionally-driven ac-
tions.
On the social sciences side, the paper pleads for a wider use of sub-
stantive rationality in the understanding of human behavior.
JEL Classication: B41,D01, D81, D82.
1 Introduction
The rational agent hypothesis is at the heart of economic theory. Developed
among the neo-classical school during the middle of the nineteenth century, this
hypothesis states that economic agents are rational, meaning that they choose
their actions in order to maximize their utility. By systematically disregarding
all non-rational behaviors, the theory has allowed economics to abstract itself
from the vagaries of human nature and, as such, has been a powerful tool in the
reshaping of the discipline as a natural science.
While other social scientists were adamant in their quest to model human
nature, economists created a world in which agents are perfectly rational, always
optimize to the best of their knowledge and make no systematic errors.
Critics of this "perfect rational man" have been lurking in the economic
literature for more than 50 years. They rightly point out that models based
on such assumptions have blatantly and repeatedly failed to foresee any market
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crash or other economic disruption from the theoretical equilibrium. They stress
the fact that economics should acknowledge the ndings of other social sciences
and build on them, rather than going on assuming improbable hypothesis.
This stream of criticisms has materialized in the behavioral branches of both
economics and nance, which seek to suggest mathematical alternatives with
rm psychological foundations to rational assumptions.
However, it ignores the fact that psychology su¤ers from its own evils. The
empirical approach adopted by the discipline condemns its theories to be reg-
ularly rejected or amended according to new empirical ndings. Moreover, by
focusing on procedural rationality rather than substantive rationality, it ignores
a convenient way and potentially useful tool to think about the unconscious.
Finally, models based on fully rational microeconomic behavior usually yield
results that are much richer, deeper and more interesting than those achieved
by behavioral models. This is probably why despite its grossly caricatural as-
sumptions, the rational agent is still so much in favor in economics.
If there is some kind of unconscious process undergoing within the psychic
activity, its inuence should be assessed by economics. If the unconscious can
be seen as a separate agent that has his own set of information, his own reward
and the ability to act in a way distinct from the conscious, then this agent
should be encompassed alongside the conscious agent, and his inuence should
be analysed within the scope of economic theory.
To put things di¤erently, economics may have been wrong in assuming one
monolithic conscious agent. It has gone one step too far in its quest of simpli-
cation, and by assuming that one body should be the siege of one rational mind.
It does not follow, however, that its global approach is wrong.
In this paper, I will explore how we can relieve ourselves from this one
assumption of the neo-classical literature, and consider the economic agent as
being composed of two rational agents, the conscious agent and the unconscious
agent.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the premises
of the model. Introducing the unconscious within an economical model requires
an extensive presentation of the acception of the unconscious agent we are con-
sidering, as well as of his operating process. Section 3 developps the model. It
species the reality modeled, the conscious and unconscious agents, their ob-
jectives, and the resulting action of the combined - so-called "dual" - agent.
Section 4 presents the results of the model at the microeconomic level. Section
5 assesses the models impact for other social sciences. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Premises
This paper will describe two agents, the conscious and the unconscious, and
their possible interactions within a single economic agent.
2.1 The conscious agent
The conscious agent considered here is the neo-classical rational agent. He ap-
prehends the parameters of the reality through noisy signals. He is rational
in the sense that he chooses his actions to optimize his welfare given all the
information at his disposal.
Since this agent will turn out to be quite familiar, I will rather dwell on the
modelisation of the unconscious agent.
2.2 The unconscious agent
2.2.1 General acceptions of the unconscious
In its very general meaning, the term "unconscious" can refer to two kinds
of psychic activities. In its rst acception, the unconscious can be seen as
the part of the psychic activity that is not part of the conscious mind, but
that ponctually emerges to the conscious mind. This would be an unconscious
punctually emerging through dreams, slip of the tongue, etc. In its second
acception, the unconscious is the part of the psychic activity that is decidedly
beyond the grasp of the conscious mind. This would be the purely "neurological
unconscious", so to speak, the unconscious that purely governs our body.
If we were to focus on the rst denition of the unconscious, and exclusively
consider the part of the mind that is not conscious, but could become conscious
at some point, we could reduce the economic agent to the traditional rational
agent only impaired by his imperfect information of reality, unaware as he would
be of some of the parameters of the reality.
This is the option followed by behavioral economics. Boots of irrationality
are seen as punctually superseeding the rational agents actions. It is taken into
account but not modeled as a rational and permanent agent.
Alternatively, if we reduced the unconscious to the second part of the former
denition, i.e. if it were the part of psychic activity beyond the reach of the
conscious mind, the parameters of the reality the unconscious agent could react
to through his action would be radically beyond the knowledge of the conscious
agent. Both the conscious and the unconscious agents could, and would indeed,
coexist in radically independent worlds. This could be seen as the neurological
unconscious.
Our purpose would be trivial, the action of the resulting economic (com-
bined) agent being the sum of two distinct and independent actions performed
by two distinct agents, endowed with radically di¤erent knowledge and clearly
dened elds of competence. Besides, in such a context, the action of the un-
conscious would be of slight interest to the economist.
3
2.2.2 An alternate denition of the unconscious
A more economical denition of the unconscious should start with recognizing
that the unconscious agents actions are not distinct from those of the conscious
agent.
Whichever actions these two conscious and unconscious agents can take sep-
arately, there is only one physical agent that will act. Therefore we cannot treat
these two agents separately.
Moreover, some human behavior, while being systematically biased and sub-
optimal, are nonetheless coherent to some extent. As such, they could be mod-
eled as the result of an alternate optimization, and in this respect, be regarded
as fully rational.
The best economical approach should therefore be to describe the uncon-
scious as a second, permanent and fully rational agent, acting alongside the
conscious, yet distinct from the latter in his reward, his perception of reality,
and necessarily constrained in his actions.
I will therefore consider the unconscious as a "permanent" agent that, when
facing a situation, confronts it to his own grid of interpretation, reacts to it
according to his own goals, i.e. maximizing his own reward, as would any
economic agent would.
2.3 Reward
I will assume that the reward of the unconscious is to guarantee the well-being
of the agent, based on a body of past knowledge, acquired through time by the
individual. This body of past knowledge can be modied by past events, so that
it can evolve through time1 , and is therefore strongly backward-looking.
More precisely, this reward must be optimal when two conditions are met:
when the individual immediate well-being is assured rst, and second, when the
structural, i.e. past conditions of the individual well-being, are met.
This means that the unconscious reward is both highly weighted towards the
immediate present, but at the same time towards conditions that have been set
in place in a very distant past, although they might have been episodically and
marginally modied through time.
2.4 Grid of lecture
I will suppose that one of the major role of the unconscious activity is to
scan, recognize and respond to the parameters of the reality, before transmitting
them, if and when need be, to the conscious. This implies that, whenever a
set of characteristics is recognized as a potentially harmful data structure, i.e.
situation, it will trigger a response from the unconscious before even hitting the
conscious. It also implies that the conscious will be endowed with most of the
parameters of the reality listed by the unconscious.
1This renement will not be modeled here, though.
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To perform this operation, it will be convenient to think the unconscious as
endowed with a structural grid of lecture through which the characteristics of
the reality are scanned and analyzed.
The unconscious being innate, it must be able to process information at the
very early stage of life. Its grid of lecture must therefore be both innate, precise
and exible. It will not consider denite complex situations, as the conscious
could perceive them. Rather, it will list a collection of relatively small units
of information considered as relevant, and compare them to pre-established
elements coded as potentially dangerous - or potentially desirable.
This assumption implies two comments. First, this unconscious agent is an
always operating agent : its action is continuous. The very fact that the con-
scious should be aware of the reality is, in our set up, the proof that the uncon-
scious is performing its function : listing the parameters of the reality, analyzing
and transmitting them to the conscious.
Second, this unconscious agent will, once the parameters of the reality are
listed, project a denite grid on these parameters, and try to identify potentially
harmful or desirable situations. In so doing, it cannot discard any element of
information. So that whereas the conscious will tend to disgard information
judged harmless, the unconscious will tend to focus on harmful situations.
So that although the unconscious we are dealing with can indeed be seen as
a rational agent, his set of information may trigger radically di¤erent actions
from those of the conscious.
3 The Model
We have shown that the unconscious has his own set of information, his own
reward, and his own action. He can therefore be considered as economically
rational. And we have mentionned that the conscious agent is the neo-classical
rational agent. Let us respectively call "conscious" and "unconscious" these two
rational economic agents, and see how to model these two rational agents into
one single agent, the "dual agent".
I will rst present the external reality that both the conscious and uncon-
scious face. I will then specify what are these two agents, and their respective
goals. I will then present the full model of the dual agent and its optimization2 .
3.1 The reality
Dealing with the conscious and unconscious suppose a context, an external sit-
uation in which actions take place. We will call it the "reality". Because we
are modeling rational agents, this reality must be described quantitatively by
means of parameters. These parameters can take various forms: set of be-
haviors, agents, costs, external conditions, interactions, all that constitute the
environment the dual agent3 faces, to which he is confronted. The only nec-
2To simplify the matter, the dynamics of the model is left for further research.
3And of course, the unconscious and the conscious, as mentioned in the paragraph above.
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essary condition here is that these parameters should be able to be measured
quantitatively, so as to be included in the reward function of the agent.
I will call  this set of parameters describing the reality. The reality  is a
vector:
 =(1; :::n) (1)
Each parameter i could actually be seen as a vector of characteristics that
fully describes i. This renement is not necessary and will therefore be ignored.
3.2 The conscious agent
The conscious is the familiar rational agent : he chooses his actions to maximize
his well-being, to the best of his knowledge. If alone, he would take an action
to optimize the social reward R:
R (a; 1; :::n) (2)
Note that this reward solely depends on the agents action and the parame-
ters of reality. Were the conscious fully informed, its optimization would trigger
the optimal action aopt. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume this action to
be a linear combination of the parameters of reality, so that aopt will be a linear
function of the parameters :
aopt =
X
ii
The optimal action is the weighed sum of the parameters of the reality, where
the i can be seen as transformers : they translate the quantitative parameters
of the reality into an action.
Insofar as the conscious is not fully informed, it can at best grasp a mixed
signal of the . This set ~ is dened as:
~ =(1 + "1; :::n + "n) (3)
where the "i are independently and identically distributed.
3.2.1 Benchmark case
A benchmark case will be dened as the optimization of the conscious, if he were
the only agent acting within the dual agent4 . Indeed, if alone, the "conscious"
agent would optimize its expectations such that
EcR (a; 1; :::n)
4And relaxing the assumption that the parameters of the reality are rst processed by the
unconscious.
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and would therefore set his action such that
a = Ecaopt =
X
iE
ci
=
X
i (i + "1)
= aopt + " (4)
where " is the overall mistake induced by the conscious incomplete infor-
mation:
" =
X
i"1
As mentioned above, this is the standard optimization of the rational agent,
where imperfect information can lead the agent to take erroneous decisions.
3.3 The unconscious agent
The unconscious, although rational, signicantly departs from the conscious in
his objective function. Besides, he is strongly backward-looking.
Because his objective is "atemporal", the unconscious does not consider
situations as they occur to the conscious, but sees them as a set of small units
of characteristics and meaningfull elements.
I will further assume that this unconscious can, as mentioned above, freely
recombine these elements. It should therefore be modeled as an agent reacting
to a recreated and distinct situation from the actual one, so that the situation
the unconscious is facing can be characterized by its own subset of parameters
u.
We dene u as:
u = (u1 ; :::
u
n) (5)
These parameters are the set of elements recognized as meaningful by the
unconscious while analysing the reality.
The unconscious systematically and continuously analyzes the present con-
text and confronts it to his own parameters. In turn, the recognition of part or
all of these parameters within the present context will trigger the unconscious
reaction. However, Because the unconscious decomposes the reality in small
units and interpret them according to its own grid of lecture, these parameters
may be dismissed by the conscious, so that u 6= i 6= .
Conscious and unconscious are therefore disymmetric. The conscious per-
ceives the reality through the fog induced by his incomplete information, while
the unconscious keeps on analyzing the reality according to a mainly backward-
looking grid of lecture.
Once the u are recognized, the unconscious will seek to maximize a reward
Ru
Ru (a; u1 ; :::
u
n)
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This reward depends on the situation spotted. Again, as mentioned above,
because the unconscious agent is backward-looking and mostly reacts to past
situations, Ru can be seen as an obsolete reward, inducing actions that actu-
ally optimize real but past situations. His actions are therefore bounded to be
suboptimal in the present context.
3.4 The dual agent
When both conscious and unconscious are combined, they form what I call the
"dual agent".
Being a combination of two agents, the conscious and the unconscious, this
dual agent reacts to two sets of parameters. The parameters of the reality
the conscious can grasp on the one hand, and the parameters the unconscious
recognizes within the reality, on the second hand.
Therefore the dual agent will, as a single agent, optimize a combination
of two rewards: the social reward of the conscious, R, and the reward of the
unconscious, Ru :
(1  )EcR (a; 1; :::n) + Ru (a; u1 ; :::un) (6)
where  is the weight of the unconscious in the process of choice. We also
assume that Ru is quadratic in the (u1 ; :::
u
n).
Stating a single reward for the two agents may seem awkward. Game Theory
would suggest that these two agents could be modeled as playing one against
the other, each having its own action. This remark calls for some additional
comments though.
3.4.1 General comments
First, it is only one agent, the "dual agent", that is playing in this model. Yet
this single action must nonetheless be the result of a combination of two rewards,
and two individual and independent possible actions.
Second, it seems di¢ cult to assess in what respect the conscious and uncon-
scious are aware of one another. Section 5 will discuss this point, but let us for
now, and to simplify the matter, suppose that conscious and unconscious are
unaware one of another. The dual agents action is the result of the combined
actions of the conscious and the unconscious, and this result cannot - at least
in the context of this paper - be reduced through Game Theory.
Of course, the timing of the action could be rened. Each agent could act
separately or sequentially, and in turn observe the result of these two actions.
Alternately, we could consider an unconscious blurring the parameters of the
conscious with his own parameters, thereby modifying the conscious reward.
Yet these situations would be equivalent, and are indeed more conveniently
modeled through a single reward, the dual agents reward, that combines both
the conscious and unconscious agentsrewards.
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3.4.2 The parameter 
The parameter  describes the "power of intrusion" of the unconscious in the
dual agents reward. The higher the , the more permeable the dual agent
action is to the unconscious analysis of the reality, or alternatively, the more
does the reality t the unconscious grid of lecture.  is therefore dependent on
the parameters  and u, and depends, in turn, on the personal history of the
dual agent. As such, it can evolve over time.
Formally, the action taken is thus a combination
a = (1  )Ecaopt +  +
X
i
u
i
= (1  )  aopt + "+ X iui
= (1  )  aopt + "+  X iui   aopt
= aopt + (1  ) "+ 
X
(i
u
i   ii) (7)
Let us now examine this equation in detail and assess the results of the
model.
4 Results
The above equation shows that the action of the dual agent is composed of three
terms.
4.1 The optimal social action
The rst term, aopt, is the optimal action the conscious would have chosen had
he been the sole agent involved, and had he been fully informed. It can be
dened as the optimal social choice.
The last two terms taken together, (1  ) "+P (iui   ii), can be seen
as an overall bias to this optimal social choice.
4.2 The bias
4.2.1 Terms of the bias
The rst term of the bias, (1  ) ", is unavoidable, and results from the con-
sciouslack of information about the parameters of the reality. It represents the
overall noise that blurs the consciouschoice, and produces a sub-optimal and
totally random outcome.
The second term of the bias, 
P
(i
u
i   ii), represents a pure action
of the unconscious. Unlike the rst term of the bias, it is not random, and
represents a systematic bias with respect to aopt.
Because the unconscious optimizes a reward, this term should not be sub-
optimal. Yet the reward of the unconscious, Ru, does not merely optimize the
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real, actual situation faced by the agent, but rather a set of past - or "atemporal"
- situations reactivated by the present situation. It only seldom represents an
optimal action vis-à-vis the present situation, as seen by the conscious, but
should rather be seen as an e¤ective loss for the conscious. Its impact on the
dual agents action will depend on the weigh given to Ru within the dual agents
optimization.
To the dual agent however, this bias is part of his optimization, and cannot
be seen as a loss. It is nonetheless ine¢ cient on a social point of view, as being
biased toward past personal events.
4.2.2 Nature of the bias
What is the exact nature of this bias? The rst intuition is that it results
from and represents combinations and di¤erences between, on the one side,
parameters seen by the conscious and, on the other side, parameters seen by
the unconscious.
While the parameters of the conscious are real and observable, the para-
meters of the unconscious are at least partly disgarded or unobservable to the
conscious, since by denition the ui are projections of the unconscious on the
parameters i. 
u
i is therefore the result of an interpretation performed by the
unconscious and, as such, uncomprehensible to the conscious. Besides, the i
are the translators of this intepretation into actions.
This overall bias can therefore be dened as an action performed by the dual
agent, directly observable to the conscious. It is a departure from the optimal
action, in that it would not necessarily be required from the situation as such.
The conscious does not control it, since it is induced by an unconscious activity,
and is the result from the "overinvestment" or "misinterpretation" of a present
situation by the unconscious.
Let us underscore that if this bias can be a material action, it is not neces-
sarily bound to be so. It could very well be an immaterial action. It could be
a slip of the tongue, for example, but it could also be a thought, an emotion,
a feeling, an exclamation, etc. If we had to name this bias in a few words, we
could call it "the emotive part of the agents action".
4.2.3 Estimation of the bias
This bias could be observable and quantitatively estimated.
Let me rst recall that the hypothesis of an imperfectly informed conscious
does not a priori allow him to suspect the presence of a bias in his optimization.
Without prior knowledge of the unconscious, the conscious would deduce ex post
- after revelation of the true parameters - that a suboptimal action resulted from
his misestimation of the situation measured by (1  ) ". Repeated mistakes
could lead him to the conclusion of a lack of estimation power.
However, the presence of the systematic bias 
P
(i
u
i   ii) could be
measured by the correlation of the mistakes in a series of similar situations.
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Indeed, measuring the average of his actions through an extended period
of time and over a large sample of similar actions could lead him to eliminate
random errors and measure an average action
a = aopt + 
X
(i
u
i   ii)
Ex-post, when aopt is revealed, the systematic bias could be measured.
We can even venture that the ui could be partly retrieved. By examining the
biases over a su¢ ciently large sample of events, one could retrieve, a minima,
some structural similarities among various situations, and postulate a struc-
tural form for a set of ui . This would help determine the form of the triggers
inducing the unconscious reaction. However, this would, given our description
of the parameters and the relevance of their structural interactions, require to
abstract oneself from the contingencies of the present situation, and rather seek
similarities within situations.
Last but not least, this bias in the action of the dual agent will not always
disappear when aggregating over agents. It will depend on the nature of the
bias. Actually, if its trigger is a common scheme among individual, and not a
personal feature, it will sum up over a population. This can give some rationale
to some common seemingly irrational behaviors.
4.3 Comments and extensions
The fact that the bias resulting from the optimization of the unconscious is
indeed observable by the conscious calls for some comments.
4.3.1 Dealing with the bias
Compensation If the dual agent could, with time, understand that he is
facing a systematic bias in his actions, he could use this bias to overweigh his
actions and compensate the unconscious bias. This approach does not imply
any knowledge of the un, but requires a constant e¤ort to compensate for the
bias, that is constantly recreated by the unconscious5 .
Rationalisation A second approach would be to reduce the weigh of the
unconscious within the optimization.
How can this be achieved? A system of trial and error could lead to guess
the ui lying behind the unconscious optimization. This is the very purpose of
an analysis, whether it is a psychoanalysis or other forms of personal analysis.
Reinterpreted in the context of this model, the purpose of such an analysis
would be to inform the unconscious that his grid of lecture is not adapted to
the actual context.
5This ever-going correction is reminiscent of time inconsistency in monetary economics.
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The unconscious as a blurring agent To keep things simple, we have
totally distinguished the conscious and unconscious perceptions of reality. It
would actually be more accurate to consider the unconscious has able to blur
the perception of the conscious.
This corresponds to replacing the consciousperception of the parameters
~ =(1 + "1; :::n + "n) (8)
by a blurred combination
~
0
=(1 + 1
u
1 + "1; :::n + n
u
n + "n) (9)
In this context, an analysis would lead to a net gain of information for the
conscious, by re-establishing the true signals ~:
5 Discussion
Let us now assess how this model can impact other social sciences.
5.1 On irrationality
Two purely rational agents optimizing their own utility function within a single
individual has resulted in an action that is a composite of both a rational and
irrational action. Indeed, what we have called in the above "the emotive part
of the action" could be as well be called an irrational action.
Irrationality does therefore not appear for its own sake, as behavioral eco-
nomics tends to use it, but rather from the coexistence of two rational agents,
each having their own grid of lecture, and bound to act through one individual.
One could argue that irrationality naturally follows from our assumptions,
more specically from the unconsciousgrid of lecture. Yet this is not so. The
conscious perceives the parameters of reality as they are, that is, how they are
transmitted by the unconscious.
This leads to the following question: if irrationality emerges from the co-
existence of two rational agents within one dual agent, what are the possible
distinction one can draw between these two agents? What could be the condi-
tions under which each agent can operate
5.2 An empirically founded theory of choice
H. Simon[17] argued that economic rationality, i.e. the assumption that ac-
tors maximize subjective expected utility, supplies only a small, and often not
essential, part of the premises in economic reasoning.
The remainder of theses premises, auxiliary empirical assumptions about
actors utilities, beliefs, expectations, to be made correctly, required, in his
words, "an empirically founded theory of choice". This theory of choice in turn
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needed to specify what information decision makers use, and how they actually
process it.
Including the unconscious as a rational agent in a simple model, and iden-
tifying in what respect this agent would di¤er from the traditional rational
conscious agent has led us to do exactly that.
In order to di¤erentiate these two agents, and allow them to see alternate
features within reality, we were bound to postulate that reality itself should be
observed as a set of parameters.
The model presented in this paper shows that an economical approach estab-
lishing a minimal framework for the description of the unconscious as a rational
agent provides a convenient way to establish and validate empirical psycholog-
ical assumptions. This is the standard scheme in which a quantitative theory
can make predictions that can be tested later on.
5.3 Conscious and Unconscious within the dual agent
How do the conscious and unconscious perceive one another within the dual
agent? We have opted in the above for a situation in which conscious and
unconscious would ignore each others presence. This stance requires some ex-
planations.
5.3.1 Mutual awareness
As we dened here, the conscious is by nature the least informed of the two
agents. He ignores many of the information the unconscious his dealing with.
For example, he ignores most of the physiological processes the unconscious is
performing constantly. As such, he might as well ignore that an other and more
informed agent exists along his side.
The unconscious is the most informed of the two agents in terms of scope of
information. In our setting, it is the unconscious agent that perfectly scans the
informational content of the reality. It is he who provides the conscious with
his set of information. Most of the information the unconscious processes may
well never be transmitted to, or taken into account by, the conscious. So that
in the end, the unconscious agent is endowed with an information set that, in
many ways, superseeds the consciousinformation.
As mentioned above, it does not follow that the unconscious is fully and per-
fectly well informed. Because we have dened the unconscious as being "atem-
poral", he is bound to ignore that an alternate information exists. In his in-
terpretation of reality, he is bound to twist it following his own grid of lecture.
Besides, he has no reason to suspect that the conscious, being a dynamic agent,
should know more than he does.
Because over the overlapping nature of the unconscious and conscious knowl-
edge and actions, the unconscious could very well ignore the consciousaction.
He could consider the conscious as an agent with such limited cognitive abilities
that it could be dismissed.
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5.3.2 Perception of others
In dealing with individual behaviors and psychological processes, one has to ask
oneself, not only how the mind actually processes information, but also how the
agent can perceive the rationale behind its environment, be it objects, persons,
situations.
How do conscious agents perceive situations ? The answer is straightforward.
As conscious agents, we perceive situations as being a mix of events, some of
them fortunate, some others unfortunate. Among all these events, some will
be intended, some other will be unintended, may they be good or bad. Our
conscious will be able to distinguish the active, intended part of othersactions,
and di¤erentiate it from what must be unintended.
But if we admit that conscious and unconscious ignore one another, how
could the dual agent perceive other peoples action?
Here, two cases can arise: either the unconscious perceives himself as being
alone within the dual agent, or he perceives the existence of a conscious agent
along his side.
One unconscious interacting with other unconscious If the unconscious
believes that he alone - as the most informed agent - decides every single action,
controls everything within the mind of the dual agent, then he must consider
the behavior of others as being the pure optimization of a single, and perfectly
rational, agent, i.e. a fully "conscious" unconscious agent.
In this case, he will never see othersactions as a "pure accident". He will
never see the bias in the others behavior as unintended or irrational. He will
rather treat it has being part of a wider optimization, that has a purpose, and
even more so, that is a part of critical importance to the others utility.
So that we can infer that an unconscious perceives the actions of others,
whatever they may be, as fully intentional, and being part of the others utility.
One dual agent interacting with other dual agents Alternately, if the
unconscious knows he is not alone, he also knows that his action will be a bias
within the dual agents action. And by observing the biases of other peoples
actions, he can rightly interpret the biases in othersactions has being driven
by their unconscious.
He could therefore determine that every departure from a purely rational
action is the sign of the others unconscious. This does not mean that he will
treat it lightly, quite the contrary. He could then act in consequence.
5.4 An economical approach to emotions
In this model, behaviors and emotions have a common ground : they are both
explained by the introduction of a second agent, the unconscious, endowed with
an alternate and specic grid of lecture of the reality.
If, according to Elster [6]:
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Whereas economists mainly try to explain behavior, emotion the-
orists try to explain emotions. By and large, psychological studies of
the emotions have not focused on how emotions generate behavior.
Instead they have tried to identify the proximate or ultimate causes
of the emotions.
in our setting, emotions do not generate behavior per se. Rather, they are a
bias to the optimal social behavior. They can be seen as being both the natural
result and the priviledged means of expression of the unconscious agent.
Identifying "the proximate or ultimate causes of the emotions" is done via
exactly the same means as explaining behavior. Moreover, this bias is not bound
to disappear through aggregation, since part, or most, of these phenomena can
be induced by unconscious collective schemes. More generally, the economic
activity or decision process being necessarily a part of psychic activity, one
cannot distinguish one from the other.
5.5 An economical approach to psychoanalysis
The simple model presented here would tend to suggest that, for the most part,
unconscious activity takes place alongside the conscious activity, on a permanent
basis.
5.5.1 On assessing the unconscious action
Considering the agent as a dual-agent would allow the observer to infer that, for
any action that is both sub-optimal and systematicly biased towards a specic
outcome, this very bias is the sign of the unconsciousoptimization.
Indeed, if for every action of the dual agent is a such that:
a = aopt + 
X
(i
u
i   ii)
there is a bias 
P
(i
u
i   ii) to the optimal social agents action, aopt.
So that whenever an action is associated with an emotion, this emotion could
be analyzed as a bias induced by the unconscious agent within the dual-agents
action.
This is a circular process. Emotions or, as we called it, "the emotive part of
the action", are a sign of the unconscious, and its rst means of expression.
5.5.2 Retrieving the parameters of the unconscious
Providing a methodology to actively and deliberately reduce the bias would
prove our point by the same token, and if need be, validate our hypotheses.
This could be done by reducing the expression (i
u
i   ii), the di¤erence
of information between the conscious and the unconscious agents.
We can venture that, should emotions be regressed against the proper set
of ui , they could be totally suppressed. This requires some further hypothesis,
and is left to be presented in a future paper.
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So that, if the rudimentary hypotheses of this model are correct, the royal
road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind should not be
dreams, as Freud suggested6 , but rather this emotive part of human activity, as
revealed by the bias of the dual agents optimization.
6 Conclusion
Modeling the unconscious as a second agent acting alongside the neo-classical
rational "conscious" agent has proved to induce a bias in this "dual agent"s
optimization. This bias, although rational and optimal under the dual agents
perspective , is actually sub-optimal with respect to the actual context. Insofar
as it is generated by predetermined collective schemes, it does not necessarily
disappear with aggregation.
The dual agent framework represents an alternative to the economic agent,
and allows to consider its actions under a psychological angle. It provides a
useful theoretical framework to analysing emotionnaly-driven outcomes. And
alternatively, it allows to consider psychological processes under an economical
point of view.
The concepts that have been discussed here allow for a certain amount of
extensions, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. On the theoretical side,
the introduction of dynamics and the introduction of interaction between the
conscious and the unconscious agents are the most obvious and immediate ex-
tensions. On the empirical side, the conception of tools to measure the bias are
called for.
6Freud, S. The Interpretation of Dreams (Die Traumdeutung), 1899/1900
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